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Abstract
Social trading platforms (STPs) are transparent online markets governed by a scopic
regime, where order flow is publicly disclosed and participants are subject to constant
reciprocal scrutiny. Participants on STPs can be categorized into trade leaders and
copiers, where the former execute unique trades and manage the funds allocated to
them by the latter in return for compensation. Given limited individual capacity and
the competition to attract copiers, we investigate whether the scopic regime produces
excess and perpetual conformism among trade leaders. Using data from a popular
STP, and from an anonymous traditional foreign exchange broker, we show that the
scopic regime produces excess levels of herding. Under the scopic environment, we
find that herding is high when market information is scarce, which is evidence of
herding due to informational cascades. We find herding to be relatively low among
risk-seeking trade leaders, which may be a sign of overconfidence. Herding is high
for larger trades, suggesting that traders herd to avoid the disappointment associated
with underperforming on large positions. Finally, we show that herding in the scopic
environment persists at much higher levels compared to traditional environments. Our
findings indicate that exposure to a scopic information-rich environment augments
the limitations and personal biases of individual traders, thus producing excess and
perpetual herding.
∗We are very grateful to Ian Marsh, Ingmar Nolte, and two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable
feedback. We also thank the seminar participants at the London School of Economics and Political Science
and Copenhagen Business School, as well as the conference audiences at Queen Mary University of London
and the Academy of Behavioral Finance & Economics for their constructive comments and suggestions.
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1 Introduction
A common phenomenon that has been documented in behavioral finance literature is that
individuals have a tendency to herd, thus accumulating on the same side of the market.
Herding behavior occurs when investors make the same decisions, either by intentionally
mimicking others’ investment strategies, or unintentionally as a result of acting on common
information. While the latter type of herding is seen as a result of efficient markets, inten-
tional herding has the potential to increase volatility and destabilize markets (Hirshleifer and
Hong Teoh, 2003). This is due to the fact that individual investors who follow the crowd,
also referred to as noise traders, have the capacity to affect asset prices since their correlated
actions are systematic (Barber et al., 2009). In recent years, the notion of herding has been
capitalized on by many brokerage firms, and incorporated into online trading, thus resulting
in a new trading environment known as social trading.
Social trading is a novel concept that combines online trading with the tools provided
by social media platforms, the result of which is a highly transparent trading marketplace
known as a social trading platform (STP), where traders come together to communicate,
collaborate on research tasks and trading strategies, and even explicitly copy each others’
trading activities in real-time using a mirror trading algorithm. This environment requires
complete disclosure from participants regarding their real-time portfolio holdings and his-
torical trading activities. Hence, STPs are governed by what is known as a “scopic regime”,
a novel concept introduced in the field of social finance, which designates a state of per-
manent reciprocal observation and scrutiny (Knorr Cetina, 2003). We adopt this term in
an interdisciplinary fashion in order to distinguish the trading environment on STPs from
the traditional trading environments. Participants in a scopic environment do not observe
each other directly but can see the outcome of each other’s actions through the order flow.
Consequently, participants are judged based on their actions, and are cognitively positioned
in a hierarchy of status levels. One manifestation of this concept is the categorization of STP
participants into two main groups: trade leaders and copiers, where the former presumably
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includes experienced traders of a superior status who manage the funds allocated to them by
the latter in return for monetary compensation. Trade leaders compete to attract potential
copiers by signaling their status as leaders, which is attained by executing original trades. In
other words, entering unique trades into the STP signifies that the trader is knowledgeable,
skilled, and confident enough not to resort to explicit copying. Copiers can simply click
a button to copy a single trade or all future trades of a certain trade leader, and do not
need to intervene except for terminating this copying relationship. Moreover, copiers can
diversify their investments across multiple trade leaders with different trading styles in aim
of decreasing their overall portfolio volatility. It is important to note that the copier still
has the authority to modify the terms of a copied trade, such as adding a stop-loss level, in
which case the trade is still considered to be copied. It follows that a trade is considered to
be unique (i.e. not explicitly copied) only in the case where it has been personally entered
by a trader into the trading platform. Moreover, the relationship between trade leaders and
copiers is largely informal, as there are no official sanctions should a trade leader go rogue,
deviate from his advertised strategy, or lose his copiers’ money.
STPs are based on the notion of complete disclosure of order flow data, which can be
particularly valuable to traders in the foreign exchange market, where studies have shown
that private order flow data of both retail investors (Nolte and Nolte, 2012, 2016) and insti-
tutional investors (Marsh and O’Rourke, 2005; Lyons, 2001; Goodhart, 1988; Lyons, 1997)
contains significant genuine information that can be used to forecast exchange rates.1 The
importance of having easy access to detailed order flow information for financial decision
making is further accentuated by the fact that there are infrequent announcements of funda-
mental data by central banks, and erratic global economic and political events that stimulate
foreign exchange markets in a random way. Hence, given the fast-paced environment of elec-
tronic trading, the limited capacity of individual traders to analyze the entire asset universe
available to them (Barber and Odean, 2008; Odean, 1999), the ease of access to (what was
1We refer to literature that focuses on the foreign exchange market since the data sets used in this study
predominantly contain currency trades.
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once privileged) detailed order flow data, and the aspiration to jump-start a career as a
money manager — with virtually no setup costs or penalties should things go awry — to
earn performance compensation, traders may be highly tempted to avoid conducting their
own analysis and making trading decisions, and simply imitate others. This can be achieved
by personally entering orders similar to those of other trade leaders after they are publicly
disclosed on the STP. Consequently, we expect that the competition to attract copiers in
the scopic environment would augment the limitations and personal biases of trade leaders,
thus producing excess and perpetual localized herding as traders continuously rely on public
order flow as a steady source of information.
Nevertheless, under traditional financial theory, the efficient market hypothesis — even in
its weakest form — postulates that given an environment with high information transparency,
asset prices should reflect all publicly disclosed information (Fama, 1998). Hence, despite
the fact that STPs facilitate the imitation of past trading activities, herding behavior should
erode (especially in the long term), as the information contained in publicly disclosed order
flow data would already be incorporated into prices. Moreover, individual retail traders
in the foreign exchange market are not expected to possess superior private (fundamental)
information. Hence, rational trade leaders would realize this and abstain from herding with
each other.
Given the lack of research on this novel phenomenon, we aim to investigate whether
the scopic regime augments the limitations and biases of individual traders, thus inducing
higher localized levels of and persistence in herding compared to those found in traditional
trading environments. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate
herding behavior of 1) traders in a scopic environment, and 2) traders in the foreign exchange
markets at the individual level in a traditional trading environment. We use two unique
proprietary data sets: the first is obtained from a popular STP, which we call SocialEx that
is governed by a scopic environment and includes over 2.6 million transactions executed by
77,476 trade leaders during 2013, and the second from a traditional online foreign exchange
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broker, which we call TradEx, and includes around 6.9 million transactions executed by
22,545 retail traders between 2011 and 2013. Since most trades on SocialEx are in currencies,
and thus the results would not be directly comparable to the literature, which focuses on
equity traders, we use TradEx as a control group in order to highlight the impact of the scopic
environment on herding behavior. Data limitations do not allow us to examine and compare
comparable subgroups of traders on the two trading platforms. Nevertheless, given the
global popularity of SocialEx, and the lack of literature on retail foreign exchange traders
suggesting variations in herding behavior arising from different demographic populations,
we work on the assumption that traders on both platforms come from similar demographic
distributions. In other words, traders on the two platforms are assumed to inherently have
similar propensities towards herding; thus any difference in herding levels between the two
platforms can be attributed to the effect of the trading environment. We adopt several
herding measures and techniques, including those developed by Lakonishok et al. (1992)
(LSV henceforth), Frey et al. (2014) (FHW henceforth), Merli and Roger (2013), Sias (2004),
and Barber et al. (2009) in order to estimate herding among traders in the different trading
environments. We conduct the analyses using quarterly, monthly, weekly, and daily data
frequencies.
In general, we find that the overall level of herding under the scopic regime on SocialEx
is significantly higher compared to the results obtained for traders on TradEx and in other
traditional trading environments. Furthermore, we estimate herding for different sub-samples
based on trading intensity, leverage, and trade size. First, we find that herding among trade
leaders is relatively high when market information is scarce, and that this phenomenon is
absent among traders on TradEx. This suggests that the scopic environment encourages
traders to seek information from the trades of others in securities that have less market
information, resulting in herding due to informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992).
Second, we find herding to be relatively low among risk-seeking trade leaders, which is in
line with the literature that risk takers are overconfident in their own decisions. Third,
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we show that herding increases as investment size increases, and that this gradually occurs
over time as individuals apprehend the disappointment associated with underperforming on
large positions, thus increasing the likelihood of following the general consensus. In addition,
trade leaders use small-sized trades in an experimental fashion to mimic potentially profitable
strategies of others. Finally, we find that herding in the scopic environment persists across
several time periods at much higher levels, and fades away much slower compared to herding
in traditional environments. This shows the added herding impact that the scopic regime
produces given the limitations and biases of individual investors to analyze many assets in a
highly dynamic environment. In summary, all our findings suggest that the excess perpetual
herding produced by the scopic environment is intentional. However, further research is
required on the predictive power of publicly disclosed order flow data in order to determine
whether the excess herding under a scopic regime is rational or simply driven by behavioral
biases.
Our findings call attention to several implications within the locale of scopic trading
environments. From a macro perspective, as STPs increase in popularity and the number
of traders choosing to herd grows, asset prices would deviate from their fundamental value
and trades would become increasingly correlated, resulting in heightened market volatility.
Moreover, the high degree of conformity on STPs can have serious consequences for copiers
who diversify their investments across trade leaders, since it results in higher correlation
among trading strategies, which in turn diminishes the volatility-reduction benefits obtained
from diversification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the theoretical
and empirical literature on herding behavior. Section 3 presents the herding measures and
techniques used. In section 4, we present the two data sets along with key descriptive
statistics. Section 5 is dedicated to the discussion of the results. The final section recaps the
findings and highlights some of the implications arising from herding on STPs.
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2 Literature Review
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine herding behavior in a social
trading context, and compare it to herding among individual foreign exchange traders in a
traditional financial setting. Given the lack of relevant literature in these two areas, we refer
to some of the most popular theoretical and empirical studies conducted on institutional as
well as individual equity investors in a traditional environment.
2.1 Theoretical Literature
Recent finance theory differentiates between intentional, and unintentional or spurious herd-
ing; however, such a task is very difficult to do in practice. Intentional herding is driven by
sentiment and entails the explicit imitation of the activities of others, which may lead to inef-
ficient markets where prices fail to reflect fundamental information, in addition to increased
volatility and destabilization of markets (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003). Nonetheless,
several researchers have proposed theories and models portraying intentional herding as a
rational behavior. For instance, models on informational herding are based on the notion that
reliable market information is scarce. The possibility that some investors are more knowl-
edgeable about the market may motivate a less informed investor to try and infer information
from past or even current trades of others, leading to informational cascades (Bikhchandani
et al., 1992; Welch, 1992). Another branch of literature rationalizes intentional herding as
a consequence of institutional schemes such as reputation and compensation. For example,
Maug and Naik (2011) find that remuneration packages may give fund managers an incen-
tive to herd, especially when the amount of compensation received is based on performance
relative to a benchmark. Similarly, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Dasgupta and Prat
(2008) examine the relationship between reputation and herding, and show that managers
would sacrifice the potential to generate high returns as a trade-off against not tarnishing
their reputation due to relative underperformance. Finally, a third reason why intentional
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herding may arise is due to weak market regulation or concentrated ownership (Borensztein
and Gelos, 2003; Viet et al., 2008; Oehler et al., 2008).
On the other hand, unintentional herding is mainly caused by investors acting on the same
or highly correlated information, which may be due to common behavioral biases, leading
them to arrive at similar trading decisions (Hirshleifer et al., 1994). Barber et al. (2009)
conduct a study on individual investors and argue that coordinated trading is primarily
driven by three behavioral factors. The first is representativeness heuristics, where investors
with similar beliefs about an asset’s performance persistence are likely to trade the same
asset. This argument echoes the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and De Bondt
(1993), who argue that investors tend to make decisions where they expect the distribution
of a small sample or short time series to be representative of that of the population. Moreover,
Falkenstein (1996) argues that managers may share a preference towards assets with specific
risk or liquidity characteristics. The second factor is investor attention, whereby individual
investors do not have the capacity to analyze all assets available to them for investment, and
may simply focus on the ones that are currently in the news spotlight or have caught their
attention (Barber and Odean, 2008; Odean, 1999). Finally, the third factor is the disposition
effect, where investors tend to avoid the regret related to selling losing investments, thus sell
winning ones instead. As such, herding arises when investors sell an asset that has recently
increased in value. Overall, we can identify two main categories of explanatory factors that
induce herding behavior: institutional, and cognitive-psychological.
2.2 Empirical Literature
Measuring herding behavior can be difficult in practice (Bellando, 2012). Nonetheless, LSV
presented a simple statistic to empirically estimate correlated trading among investors, which
has since become a standard measure of herd behavior. The LSV measure analyzes the
aggregate buying pressure on a specific asset for a group of traders over a period of time.
LSV apply their measure to U.S. equity pension fund managers and find an overall mean
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herding level of 0.027. The following quote by LSV (1992: p. 30) aids in the understanding
of how this figure is interpreted:
“. . . it implies that if p, the average fraction of changes that are increases,
was 0.5, then 52.7% of the money managers were changing their holdings of an
average stock in one direction and 47.3% in the opposite direction.”
Many empirical studies on herding among institutional investors have been based on the
seminal work of LSV. For instance, Grinblatt et al. (1995) use a sample of 274 mutual funds
from 1974 to 1984 and find weak evidence of herding with a mean LSV measure of 2.5%.
Similarly, Graham (1999) and Wermers (1999) use more recent samples of U.S. mutual funds
and report slightly higher herding levels. In contrast to the U.S. market, researchers have
estimated herding to be higher in emerging markets and several European markets such as in
Germany (Walter and Moritz Weber, 2006; Frey et al., 2014; Kremer and Nautz, 2013), the
U.K. (Wylie, 2005), France (Arouri et al., 2013), Poland (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005), and
Portugal (Lobao and Serra, 2007). The higher level of herding in these markets is attributed
to the stage of development of the financial system (Walter and Moritz Weber, 2006; Oehler
et al., 2008), ambiguous information (Lobao and Serra, 2007), highly concentrated stock
ownership (Viet et al., 2008), or weak market regulation (Borensztein and Gelos, 2003).
While the evidence in the literature shows that herding varies across countries and exchanges
(Griffin et al., 2003), Gebka and Wohar (2013) find that it is virtually non-existent when
studied at the international level. LSV state that in the market as a whole, one cannot
detect herding since there is an equal number of assets bought and sold. Hence, herding can
only be examined within subgroups of investors.
For instance, LSV and Voronkova and Bohl (2005) find more pronounced herding in
small-cap stocks. Since market capitalization is often used as a proxy for the amount and
quality of information available, higher herding levels in small-cap stocks is interpreted as
evidence of intentional herding when information is scarce. This finding is in line with
the theory of information availability discussed by Wermers (1999), whereby investors are
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more likely to herd in situations where there is very little market information. Opposing
evidence is presented by FHW, who use both the LSV measure as well as their proposed
herding measure, and find a decreasing relationship as well as below average herding levels
for smaller stocks based on the LSV measure. However, they find that the number of fund
managers active in a stock is positively related to market capitalization. Consequently, one
should expect higher herding estimates for larger stocks due to the lower bias. The FHW
measure, on the other hand, shows a u-shaped relationship with a higher level of herding for
the smallest stocks. The study by Merli and Roger (2013) on individual investors also shows
evidence of higher herding levels for large market capitalization stocks; however, this result
is not obtained for all quarterly periods and is not robust when using the FHW measure.
Several studies examine herding behavior in relation to trading intensity by progressively
increasing the minimum threshold for the number of transactions in each asset. For instance,
Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wylie (2005), Merli and Roger (2013), and FHW report stronger
evidence of herding in sub-samples with a high trading intensity. On the other hand, Wermers
(1999) finds little variation in the level of herding across the different thresholds for trading
intensity. The author shows that herding decreases to just over 3% as trading intensity
increases to more than 50 funds, and notes that the highest trading activity is found in
large-cap stocks, which exhibit lower levels of herding. As such, the author argues that
increasing the minimum threshold of trade intensity implicitly changes the sample to larger
and more liquid stocks, which may overshadow any increase in herding that might arise from
a larger number of funds active in the stocks.
Another branch of literature focuses on herding behavior among individual investors.
Using daily transactions of more than 37,000 individual investors at a German discount
broker from 1998 to 2000, Dorn et al. (2008) report a mean LSV estimate of 8.3%. The
authors argue that the high level of herding appears to be primarily driven by correlated
speculative motives. Moreover, a study performed by Barber et al. (2009) uses two data
sets, the first composed of 66,465 investors obtained from a discount broker, and the second
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containing 665,544 investors at a retail broker. The authors report LSV herding measures
of 6.81% and 12.79%, respectively for these data sets. Finally, Merli and Roger (2013) use a
sample of 87,373 French retail investors obtained from a major European broker house from
1999 to 2006, and report higher herding levels compared to previous studies.
The general consensus in the literature is that herding among individual investors is
higher compared to institutional investors, and that this higher level is attributed to indi-
vidual psychological as well as cognitive factors. While these studies examine herding under
traditional trading environments, the scopic regime governing STPs raises the following ques-
tions. What happens when retail traders find themselves in an environment that embraces
the free flow of information and encourages social interactions? Does the social aspect of the
STP unveil the personal biases of individuals and their limited analytical capacity, such that
the scopic environment induces an additional herding effect? We expect that such a trading
environment will encourage higher perpetual herding among trade leaders as a mechanism
for preserving their status.
3 Methodology
3.1 The LSV Herding Measure
The LSV measure (HLSV henceforth) estimates herding, which occurs when the proportion
of traders in a given asset trading in the same direction (buying or selling) is greater than
the proportion of traders in the entire asset universe that are in that direction under the null
hypothesis that trading decisions are independent. The HLSV measure can be expressed as:
HLSVi,t = |pii,t − pˆit| − E
[∣∣∣∣∣ b˜i,tni,t − pˆit
∣∣∣∣∣ ; b˜i,t ∼ B(pˆit, ni,t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AFi,t
(1)
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where pii,t = bi,t/ni,t is the buy proportion of traders, such that bi,t is the number of traders
buying, and ni,t is the total number of active traders in security i during period t. The
parameter pˆit =
∑I
i=1 bi,t∑I
i=1 ni,t
is the average proportion of traders buying relative to the total
number of active traders in the entire asset universe I in period t, which is also the expected
probability of being a buyer under the null hypothesis of no herding. Since the first term
on the right in Equation (1) will be positive even under the null hypothesis (due to the
stochastic nature of trades), the second term, AFi,t, is an adjustment factor that corrects
for this expected dispersion. The adjustment factor allows for random variation around pˆit
under the null hypothesis of independent trading decisions, and is the expected value of the
left-hand term in Equation (1), when the number of buyers b˜i,t is binomially distributed
with probability pˆit and ni,t independent draws. The overall degree of herding behavior is
measured by averaging HLSVi,t across all security-periods, i, t. A positive and significant
HLSV measure indicates the existence of herding behavior.
The HLSV measure has been criticized by many academics in the literature because it
suffers from several drawbacks. First, FHW and Bellando (2012) demonstrate that under the
alternative hypothesis of herding, the HLSV measure has a positive value in expectations,
resulting in a downward bias relative to the true herding measure that increases with the
level of herding. However, these two studies show that the bias decreases as the number
of active traders in the asset during the period increases. While ignoring the adjustment
factor in the HLSV measure would overstate the true herding level, including it results
in an over-correction of the excess dispersion, leading to a downward bias. To overcome
this issue, FHW propose an alternative measure of herding behavior, which they claim
is an unbiased and consistent estimate of the true level of herding. Second, the HLSV
measure does not allow us to identify intertemporal changes in herding behavior. While
we are able to study how investors herd in a given security over time, this measure does
not permit us to examine whether it is the same individuals that continue to herd in that
asset. Merli and Roger (2013) propose an alternative herding measure, called the Investor
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Herding Measure, which examines herding at the individual level. Finally, Bikhchandani
and Sharma (2000) argue that the LSV measure captures both intentional and unintentional
herding. Differentiating between these two types of herding behavior is crucial since the
latter is an expected product of an efficient market, while the former has the potential of
increasing volatility and destabilizing markets. As such, Sias (2004) presents a dynamic
approach that differentiates between traders who follow their own trades, and traders who
follow the trades of others, which he argues is the true herding behavior of individuals. In
what follows, we present these alternative herding measures.
3.2 The FHW Herding Measure
FHW propose an alternative measure (labeled HFHW henceforth), which they argue is a
consistent estimate of the true herding level. The rationale behind this measure is similar
to that of the HLSV, in the sense that it calculates the excess dispersion of trades on either
side of the market (buy or sell). The HFHW measure can be written as:
H2i,t =
(bi,t − pˆitni,t)2 − ni,tpˆit(1− pˆit)
ni,t(ni,t − 1) , (2)
where pˆit is the average proportion of traders buying relative to the total number of active
traders in the entire asset universe I in period t. In addition, bi,t is the number of traders
buying and ni,t is the total number of active traders in security i during period t, such that
pii,t is the proportion of buyers.
The H2 measure is averaged across securities and periods to obtain an estimate of the
overall herding behavior. Let the set of all security-periods i, t be denoted by A. It follows
that the aggregated measure of herding can be written as:
H2A =
1
#A
∑
i,t∈A
H2i,t. (3)
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In order to make the aggregated herding measure comparable to the HLSV, the square root
of the overall herding value is taken as follows:
HFHWA ≡
√
H2A. (4)
While HLSV is biased under the alternative hypothesis of herding, but performs well
under the null hypothesis, the opposite is true for HFHW. FHW argue that given a small
number of traders n, HFHW would exhibit a downward bias which stems from the non-
linearity of taking the square root of the unbiased estimator H2.
One criticism of the HFHW measure is that it is only unbiased in the particular envi-
ronment considered by the authors, where pˆi = 0.5. Bellando (2012) argues that when the
probability of no herding is not null, HFHW exhibits an upward bias, which arises when
aggregating the H2 measure across all security-periods. While it is practically impossible to
compute the true herding level, the author shows that this value is bounded by the lower
HLSV estimate and the upper HFHW estimate.
3.3 The Investor Herding Measure (IHM)
The HLSV and HFHW measures estimate herding at the security level, thus only allowing
us to study how traders herd in a certain security during a period of time. Thus, these
measures do not indicate whether it is the same individuals who are herding within the same
security. Merli and Roger (2013) address this by introducing an alternative measure called
the Investor Herding Measure (IHM), which only considers herding for the securities traded
by the trader.
Similar to Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wermers (1999), we differentiate between buy
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herding (pii,t > pˆit) and sell herding (pii,t < pˆit), and write the signed HLSV measure as:
SLSVi,t =

HLSVi,t | pii,t > pˆit
−HLSVi,t | pii,t < pˆit
=

pii,t − pˆit − AFi,t
pii,t − pˆit + AFi,t
(5)
Given Equation (5), each transaction may be assigned to one of six potential scenarios:
Buying Selling
SLSV > 0 Herding Anti-Herding
SLSV < 0 Anti-Herding Herding
SLSV = 0 No Herding No Herding
When the trader trades only one asset, estimating herding behavior is relatively simple.
For instance, a trader who trades only one security will have a herding value equal to the
SLSV estimate of that security if the position is a buy, and to -SLSV if the position is a sell.
Once a trader becomes active in multiple assets, measuring herding behavior becomes much
more complex. Merli and Roger (2013) propose weighing the herding value in a security by
the size of the trade, and the sum of the weighted herding measure is subsequently divided
by the sum of the trades of the trader during the period. The IHM can be written as:
IHMj,t =
I∑
i=1
(ni,j,t − ni,j,t−1)P i,tSLSVi,t
I∑
i=1
|ni,j,t − ni,j,t−1|P i,t
, (6)
where P i,t is the average price at which security i is bought or sold over the period [t, t−1], and
the term (ni,j,t−ni,j,t−1)P i,t is the average value of the trades in security i. The denominator
in Equation (6) is the sum of the values of all trades made by trader j during the period.
A positive IHM means that the trader exhibits herding behavior, while a negative value
suggests anti-herding behavior.
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3.4 The Sias Herding Measure
HLSV and HFHW are static measures that estimate contemporaneous herding within the
same time period. Sias (2004) proposed a dynamic approach that examines whether a
trader’s tendency to buy an asset persists over time. The Sias measure is based on the
standardized buyer ratio, which is expressed as:
∆i,t =
pii,t − pˆit
σ(pii,t)
, (7)
where σ(pii,t) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the buyer ratios across i securities
during time t. The Sias herding measure, which we denote by SIASfull, is estimated by
computing the correlation between the standardized buyer ratios in two consecutive periods.
This can be done by estimating a cross-sectional regression for each period t as:
∆i,t = βt∆i,t−1 + i,t, (8)
and then calculating the time-series average of the β coefficients. A high buyer ratio typically
suggests a high HLSV estimate; however, it does not necessarily imply a high SIASfull
estimate, since the latter depends on the buyer ratio at the subsequent trading day.
Furthermore, Sias (2004) differentiates between individuals who follow their own trades,
SIASown, and individuals who follow the trades of others, SIASother. The author argues
that the latter captures the true herding behavior of individuals. Formally, the Sias measure
can be decomposed into these two components:
β = ρ(∆i,t,∆i,t−1) =
[
1
(I − 1)σ(pii,t)σ(pii,t−1)
] I∑
i=1
Ni,t∑
n=1
(Dn,i,t − pˆit)(Dn,i,t−1 − pˆit−1)
Ni,tNi,t−1

+
[
1
(I − 1)σ(pii,t)σ(pii,t−1)
] I∑
i=1
Ni,t∑
n=1
Ni,t−1∑
m=1,m 6=n
(Dn,i,t − pˆit)(Dm,i,t−1 − pˆit−1)
Ni,tNi,t−1
 ,
(9)
where Ni,t is the number of traders trading security i during time t, and I is the number
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of securities traded. Dn,i,t is a binary variable that takes the value of one if trader n is
a net buyer in security i during time t, and zero otherwise. Dm,i,t−1 is a binary variable
that takes the value of one if trader m, where m 6= n, is a net buyer during time t − 1.
Thus, the first component in Equation (9) represents the portion of the cross-sectional inter-
temporal correlation that stems from traders following their own strategies due to buying
or selling the same security over two consecutive trading periods. The second component in
the equation represents the portion of the correlation that arises due to traders following the
trades of others in a previous adjacent period. Sias (2004) argues that a positive correlation
that results from traders following others can be interpreted as evidence of informational
cascades.
3.5 Testing for Persistence in Herding
In our final analysis, we adopt an approach similar to that applied by Barber et al. (2009) to
test whether traders’ decisions are correlated across different trading periods. We examine
the persistence in herding such that persistence exists if the autocorrelation of purchase
intensities pii,t is high. In other words, a high (low) purchase intensity in asset i at time t is
followed by a high (low) purchase intensity in future periods.
To conduct this analysis, we divide the data set into two equally sized random groups
of traders, labeled G1 and G2, respectively. For each of the two groups, we calculate the
purchase intensities for every asset during each period t, which are denoted by piG1i,t and pi
G2
i,t ,
respectively. We subsequently calculate the contemporaneous correlations between the pur-
chase intensities, resulting in a time-series of correlations for each time period. If the traders’
trading decisions are independent, then no correlation between piG1i,t and pi
G2
i,t is expected. To
test this hypothesis, we calculate the average mean contemporaneous correlation, followed
by a test of significance to check whether the correlation is different from zero. Barber et al.
(2009) explain that the null hypothesis of no correlation between the purchase intensities
is synonymous to the null hypothesis of no herding behavior when applying the HLSV and
17
HFHW measures. While this analysis does not allow us to differentiate between intentional
and unintentional herding, it simply indicates whether trading decisions are correlated.
Next, we measure the degree of persistence in herding behavior by calculating the corre-
lations between the purchase intensities at time t and t + τ — due to space limitations we
only report the results where τ = 1 → 11 for monthly periods, and τ = 1 → 40 for weekly
and daily periods. Recall that the contemporaneous correlations to test the null hypothesis
of no herding are obtained by setting τ = 0. When τ > 0, then the degree of persistence in
herding behavior is computed. For example, by setting τ = 1, the correlation between the
purchase intensities between period t and the consecutive period t + 1 is computed. This
calculation is repeated with different values for τ , and is conducted on each of the two ran-
dom groups of traders, separately. Moreover, this calculation is also applied to both groups
together, such that we compute the correlations between the purchase intensities of the first
group of traders G1 at time t, and those of the second group G2 at time t+ τ .
4 Data
We use two unique proprietary data sets where the first is obtained from a popular STP,
which we call SocialEx, and the second from a traditional online retail foreign exchange
broker, which we call TradEx.
The data limitations in this paper do not allow us to identify and examine comparable
subgroups of traders on the two platforms. However, given the global popularity of SocialEx,
and the lack of literature on retail foreign exchange traders suggesting potential differences in
herding behavior due to demographic characteristics, we work on the assumption that traders
on both platforms come from similar demographic distributions. Consequently, traders on
both platforms are assumed to inherently have similar propensities towards herding. This
implies that the variation in herding levels between the two platforms can be attributed to
the effect of the trading environment. Moreover, we are unable to thoroughly investigate the
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relation between herding and trader performance, such as return on investment, due to the
lack of information on trader balances in our data sets. To illustrate, a profit of one unit
for a trader with a balance of 10 units equals a return of 10%, whereas the same amount of
profit for a trader with a balance of 100 units translates into a return of 1%. We highlight
this data limitation as a potential opportunity for future research.
4.1 SocialEx Data
The first data set is obtained from SocialEx, one of the largest and most popular STPs, and
contains over 63 million transactions executed by all participants during 2013. SocialEx of-
fers traders a wide range of assets from several markets, including currencies, commodities,
and equities. Participants on SocialEx do not trade the actual asset, but instead open a
position through a standardized contract for difference (CFD) that is written on the asset.
A CFD is an electronic contract between a trader and a broker (the CFD provider), whereby
the trader forgoes physical ownership of the underlying asset for a contract with the broker
that provides the same economic exposure (Norman, 2009). CFDs are essentially derivative
instruments that allow traders to gain exposure and speculate on the direction of the un-
derlying asset, without the need of ownership. These contracts are traded on margin, thus
permitting highly leveraged positions. The STP records the details of each CFD transaction,
including the opening and closing prices, the amount bought or sold, the leverage used, the
direction, as well as the time-stamp of each trade. Since this study is focused on the herding
behavior among trade leaders, we apply a strict criterion where we only select traders whose
transactions were all personally entered into the STP during 2013 (i.e. those who did not
explicitly copy others using mirror trading).2 It is important to note that many traders can
have a mix of personal as well as explicitly copied trades; however, these traders are not
considered to be trade leaders but rather copiers who reserve a portion of their capital for
2Investigating the explicit copying relationship between trade leaders and copiers is also an interesting
topic; however, for the purposes of the present study, we only focus on trade leaders who are the ones making
the trading decisions.
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personal trading. Executing only personal trades signals potential superior status, confi-
dence, and skill, whereby the trade leader is seen by copiers as a unique and autonomous
entity with the ability to add value.
The final sample encompasses over 2.6 million transactions executed by 77,476 trade
leaders. These transactions can be categorized according to the asset traded as follows:
currencies constitute the majority with 83.14% of transactions, whereas commodities, indices,
and stocks make up 11.21%, 3.6% and 2.05%, respectively. Moreover, we calculate several
trading characteristics, which are first averaged across all transactions for each trade leader,
and then averaged across all trade leaders. These statistics are presented in Table 1. On
average, 66.11% of transactions are long positions, with a mean leverage ratio of 175. These
results are consistent with the idea that trade leaders are considered to be sophisticated,
such that they enter in both long and short positions, and are confident enough in their
trading abilities to employ high levels of leverage. Regarding the average trade duration,
trade leaders keep transactions open for approximately 6 days, which indicates that they
are aware of the impact of rollover costs on profits associated with keeping positions open
over the weekend. Similarly, the average number of annual trades for trade leaders is around
34, which is much lower than that of the entire sample of participants — the average for
the entire sample is 207 —, indicating that trade leaders account for trading costs when
optimizing their strategies. Finally, we find that trade leaders trade in around three to four
different assets, which suggests that they tend to be specialized in specific assets.
4.2 TradEx Data
The second data set is obtained from a foreign exchange broker, which we call TradEx, and
includes more than 6.9 million transactions in 22 currency pairs, executed by 22,545 retail
traders between January 2011 and September 2013. TradEx does not offer participants any
social trading features, and does not allow the explicit copying of trades, hence we consider all
trades to be unique. We calculate several trader characteristics, which are presented in Table
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2. On average, 47% of a trader’s positions on the TradEx platform are buys, which is around
20% less compared to trade leaders on SocialEx. This suggests that traders on TradEx adopt
more short selling strategies. The average trade duration on TradEx is around 1.19 days,
which is considerably less than the duration of trades on SocialEx. This suggests that many
traders on TradEx are day traders who minimize their exposure to overnight fluctuations in
prices. We find that the average number of annual trades is 111, which is almost three times
the figure for trade leaders on SocialEx. Given that traders on TradEx are day traders, the
higher trade frequency suggests that these individuals seek to exploit intraday price trends.
Finally, we find that traders on TradEx trade in an average of 6 different currency pairs.
This number is slightly higher than that of trade leaders on SocialEx, and suggests that
traders on TradEx have a wider scope when searching for trading opportunities to exploit.
5 Results
In order to test whether the scopic regime governing STPs leads to excess herding, we use
the two data sets, SocialEx and TradEx, and estimate herding behavior using the measures
presented earlier for quarterly (Q), monthly (M), weekly (W), as well as daily (D) periods.3
We recalculate these herding measures for subgroups of these two data sets based on
trading intensity, leverage4, and trade size. Given that the two trading platforms offer
different assets and the data sets span over different time periods, we repeat all the analyses
on common subsets that are selected by only considering the overlapping time frame and the
common assets traded on the two platforms. The results and conclusions we obtain using
the common subsets are very similar to those obtained using the full data sets, hence we do
not report the results of the common subsets due to space limitations.
3Kremer and Nautz (2013) show that the frequency at which the data is observed can have a significant
impact on the herding estimates calculated, and subsequently the inferences made about the underlying
subjects. Hence, we compute all herding measures using quarterly, monthly, weekly, and daily frequencies.
4This analysis is only conducted for the SocialEx data set which allows traders to choose their desired
leverage ratio for each trade. The TradEx platform does not allow traders to choose a custom leverage ratio,
but instead provides a constant leverage of 200 to 1.
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5.1 Overall Herding
For SocialEx, the results presented in Table 3 where n ≥ 0 (i.e. no restrictions on trade
intensity) show that the level of herding among trade leaders ranges between the lower
HLSV limits of 19.5%, 18.9%, 16.6%, and 11.8% and the upper HFHW limits of 26.4%,
27.0%, 26.0%, and 21.1% for Q, M, W, and D frequencies, respectively. The IHM also
shows evidence of herding with a lower estimate of 1.5% based on a quarterly frequency,
and a higher estimate of 3.28% based on a daily frequency. Regarding the Sias measures, we
report high and significant SIASfull herding estimates for all frequencies. More importantly,
we find that a large portion of herding behavior stems from traders following the previous
trades of others, as indicated by the high SIASother estimates. For example, we report daily
SIASfull and SIASother estimates of 0.775 and 0.759, respectively, indicating that 97.9% of
herding is due to traders mimicking others.
The results for TradEx are presented in Table 4. For the full data set (where n ≥ 0),
we report HLSV estimates of 2.5%, 3.3%, 3.4%, and 3.5% and HFHW estimates of 5.0%,
8.0%, 8.7%, and 10.0% for Q, M, W, and D periods, respectively. Regarding the IHM, we
report significant herding levels with a lower quarterly estimate of 0.17%, and a higher daily
estimate of 0.92%. The results obtained for these three herding measures are significantly
lower compared to those obtained for trade leaders on SocialEx, which suggests that the
scopic regime encourages herding. With respect to the Sias measures, the estimates obtained
for all periods are lower than those obtained for SocialEx. For instance, we report daily
SIASfull and SIASother estimates of 0.361 and 0.335, respectively, which are around half
the values reported for SocialEx. Nevertheless, the portion of herding resulting from traders
following others (92.8%) is high for traders on TradEx. This may be due to traders adopting
common momentum strategies that reflect the previous trading decisions of others.
Our results show significant evidence of a higher overall level of herding among traders
under the scopic regime compared to the traditional trading environment. Moreover, the
level of herding under the scopic regime is higher compared to the results presented by
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studies on retail investors in traditional equity markets. Dorn et al. (2008) estimate a mean
HLSV of 8.3%, Barber et al. (2009) find herding levels of 6.81% and 12.79% for each of the
two data sets they use, and Merli and Roger (2013) conclude that herding among French
individual investors falls between the lower HLSV limit of 12.63% and the upper HFHW
limit of 21.70%.
The evidence we present clearly indicates that herding behavior among trade leaders on
the STP is much higher compared to herding in a traditional trading environment. While
part of this herding behavior may be driven by factors that affect traders on both plat-
forms equally, such as common reactions to news announcements, the excess herding can be
attributed to the effect of the scopic environment.
5.2 Herding and Trading Intensity
We re-estimate the herding measures using sub-samples of the two data sets that are chosen
by applying various thresholds to the minimum number of traders in each security. A higher
minimum threshold implies greater trading intensity and liquidity in the sub-sample.
Table 3 shows the results for SocialEx. We find an inverse relationship between herding
and the number of traders active in the security, where both the HLSV and HFHW estimates
decrease as the number of traders active in a security increases for all frequencies. A similar
relation is found for the Sias measures, while the IHM measure shows rather constant herding
levels across the thresholds. Our results are similar to the evidence presented by Wermers
(1999), and may be explained by the theory of information availability and informational
cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992). Securities with low liquidity are generally
not extensively covered by analysts, resulting in scarcity of information. Due to the lack of
sufficient information, these securities attract a small number of active traders who may turn
to interpreting other traders’ transactions as a scarce source of valuable information. By
doing so, herding levels in illiquid securities are likely to be higher compared to those where
information is more abundant. In order to test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the herding
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measures at the various thresholds; however, we use a sample containing only the most
liquid instruments. This sample includes the major currency pairs: EUR/USD, GBP/USD,
NZD/USD, USD/CAD, USD/JPY, USD/CHF, and AUD/USD. The HLSV estimates for
all thresholds are constant and equal to 8.9%, 8.5%, 8.1%, and 6.8% for Q, M, W, and D
frequencies, respectively, while the HFHW estimates are constant and equal to 12.0%, 13.3%,
12.4%, and 11.2%, for Q, M, W, and D frequencies, respectively. As a consequence, the high
herding levels found in less liquid securities can be attributed to lack of sufficient market
information.
The results for the TradEx data set are reported in Table 4, and show that the HLSV
and HFHW estimates are low and constant for all trading intensity thresholds, and across
all frequencies. Regarding the IHM, we also report constant estimates across all thresholds
for Q, M, and W frequencies. As for the daily frequency, we report decreasing estimates
as trading intensity increases, which is evidence of herding due to informational cascades
resulting from the low amount of information that is available during the very short daily
time frame. We find that the SIASfull estimates are relatively constant across all thresholds
for Q and M periods, and have no or weak significance for W and D periods. However, when
we analyze the components of the Sias measure separately, we find statistical significance
and constant estimates across all thresholds and frequencies, which is in line with the results
of the other measures.
To summarize, herding behavior among trade leaders on SocialEx is higher compared to
the results for traders on TradEx for all trading intensities and frequencies. This supports
our earlier finding that the scopic environment encourages herding behavior. Moreover, we
find that herding in the sub-samples that include assets with low trading intensities (i.e. less
liquid assets) is higher only in the SocialEx data set, while this variation is largely lacking
in the TradEx data. This suggests that, when trading illiquid assets where information is
scarce, traders under the scopic regime try to seek information from the trades of others.
Given that order flow is publicly disclosed in a scopic environment, this entices individuals
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to herd, which can be interpreted as evidence of intentional herding driven by informational
cascades.
5.3 Herding and Leverage
The second relationship that we examine is between herding and the degree of leverage used
by trade leaders, which is an indication of their risk appetite. This analysis is only conducted
on the SocialEx data set since the SocialEx platform allows traders to select their desired
leverage ratio, while TradEx imposes a 200 to 1 leverage for all trades. We estimate the
herding measures for the different leverage subgroups and present the results in Table 5.
The results for the HLSV, HFHW, and IHM measures show a concave relationship be-
tween the degree of leverage and herding. In particular, highly risk-averse traders such as
those with leverage ratios of 2 to 1 and 5 to 1 exhibit relatively lower herding levels compared
to less risk-averse traders (or medium risk takers with leverage ratios between 10 to 1 and 50
to 1). One possible reason for this result is the scarcity of observations in the lowest leverage
subgroups. The last two columns of Table 5, specifically for the leverage ratios 2 to 1 and 5
to 1, show that the number of security-periods and the average number of trades are rela-
tively low compared to the figures shown for other leverage ratios. As a consequence, FHW
show using Monte Carlo simulation that, unless the number of trades in a security-period is
extremely large, then the HLSV and HFHW measures — as well as the IHM, which is based
on the signed HLSV measure — will be biased downward. Another behavioral explanation
for this low level of herding is that these trades can be seen as experimental, where trade
leaders try out new strategies without taking on too much risk. We could not compute the
Sias measures for the 2 to 1 leverage subgroup due to lack of sufficient adjacent observations
when estimating Equation (8). As for the 5 to 1 leverage subgroup, we find significant results
for the quarterly and monthly frequencies; however the low number of observations renders
these results equivocal.
With respect to herding behavior of risk-seeking trade leaders (leverage ratios of 100
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to 1, 200 to 1, and 400 to 1), the results show that herding levels are lower than those of
their medium-risk counterparts when we examine the HLSV, HFHW, and IHM measures.
The results obtained for the Sias measures are mixed, with low frequency periods (Q and
M) showing higher herding for risk-seeking traders, while high frequency periods (W and
D) showing lower herding. However, the overall relation is that traders with higher leverage
ratios tend to herd less. This phenomenon is well documented in the literature by studies such
as Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Gu¨mbel (2005), who find that fund managers who are
likely to herd are more risk averse than non-herding managers. The idea is that overconfident
traders take on more risk because they tend to underestimate risk and overestimate the
conditional expected return from their trading strategies (Odean, 1998; Hirshleifer and Luo,
2001). Analogously, it follows that high risk takers are overconfident in their trading skills
and strategies, hence they tend to herd less (De Long et al., 1990, 1991; Hirshleifer and Luo,
2001).
Being risk-prone and overconfident does not necessarily mean that one is more knowl-
edgeable. Highly leveraged trades can be seen as “black swan” trades, which are executed
by traders who have a particularly high level of confidence and tolerance for volatility. This
can deter other trade leaders from herding, since they would suffer great financial losses and
taint their reputation in case the black swan trade goes sour. The safest herding strategy to
preserve status as a trade leader would be to stand in the middle of the risk spectrum, and
imitate moderately risky trades where a loss will not have a detrimental impact on reputa-
tion. In addition, allowing highly leveraged traders to fly solo would work to one’s advantage
when their trades accrue losses, as this thins out the competition among trade leaders.
5.4 Herding and Trade Size
The third analysis examines the variation in herding depending on trade size. Many studies
on hedge funds and mutual funds have shown that as fund managers mature and grow their
assets under management, they are more likely to herd because they have more to lose in
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terms of compensation (Boyson, 2010; Graham, 1999; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Following
this reasoning, we argue that traders with larger positions are likely to herd more in order
to avoid the disappointment of underperforming their peers.
To test this, we first divide the two data sets into quintiles based on trade size, where
quintile 1 encompasses the trades with the largest trade sizes while quintile 5 contains the
smallest trades, and we estimate the herding measures for each quintile.
The results for SocialEx are presented in Table 6. For quintiles 1 to 4, we show that
the quarterly and monthly HLSV and HFHW estimates are higher for larger sized trades.
These results are consistent with our argument that the larger a trader’s investment, the
more he has to lose, and the more he is likely to herd. The estimates for the weekly and daily
frequencies show relatively constant herding levels for these quintiles. One explanation for
the lack of variation in herding levels across quintiles for the higher frequencies (W and D)
is that traders may perform well and increase their wealth and future trade sizes in a short
time period, but may take a longer amount of time to fathom the potential disappointment
associated with poor performance on large trades. As such, these traders will not exhibit high
levels of herding in the short term, as indicated by the W and D results. However, as time
passes and these individuals begin to understand the magnitude of losses on large positions,
they tend to herd more with their peers. Thus, the Q and M frequencies examine herding
within a longer period, where traders have sufficient time to learn about the disappointment
of underperformance. The estimates for the Sias measures also show higher herding for the
lower frequencies (Q and M), and lower herding for the higher frequencies (W and D), which
further supports our argument. The IHM shows opposing but weak results compared to the
HLSV and HFHW measures.
With respect to the smallest trade size quintile, herding is estimated to be relatively
high for all herding measures. This may be attributed to trade leader sophistication. Our
argument draws from the conclusion of Doering et al. (2015) who find significant correlations
between social trading returns and almost all the hedge fund trading strategies they consider,
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indicating that trade leaders may be adopting sophisticated strategies. Hence, we argue that
herding behavior for the smallest trade size quintile may be interpreted as follows: a trader
invests a small portion of their wealth to buy an option that allows them to mimic the
trades of others. Similar to a financial option, the downside risk is limited to the trader’s
small investment, while there is unlimited upside potential. This option allows the trader
to either continue herding and increase their exposure to the other trader if the copied
strategy performs well, or to simply cut their losses in case the strategy performs poorly.
Nevertheless, further analysis is required in order to understand the relationship between
trader sophistication and trade size.
Regarding TradEx, the results reported in Table 7 show that the estimate for all the
herding measures are significantly lower compared to the results for SocialEx. The HLSV and
HFHW estimates show that traders herd the most when trade size is large, which is consistent
with our main argument. The IHM shows relatively constant levels of herding across the
trade-size quintiles. With respect to the SIASfull measure, we report in general statistically
insignificant results. However, when we analyze the decomposed component SIASother, we
find mostly significant estimates that are relatively constant across the quintiles — with the
exception of a high quarterly estimate of 68.8% for quintile 5. Nevertheless, the dominating
evidence suggests that herding is higher for larger trades.
5.5 Persistence in Herding
We present the contemporaneous and time-series correlations of purchase intensities for So-
cialEx and TradEx in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively.
For SocialEx, the first row of the table (where τ = 0) shows that the contemporaneous
correlations of pii,t between G1 and G2 are 98.5%, 95.9%, and 77.4% for M, W, and D
frequencies, respectively. These figures indicate a very high correlation between the trading
decisions of the two random groups of trade leaders in a given period. As explained by Barber
et al. (2009), these correlations have an intuitive interpretation, such that the square of the
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contemporaneous correlation is equivalent to the R2 obtained from regressing the purchase
intensities of G1 on those of G2. For example, the R
2 based on a quarterly frequency equals
97.02%, meaning that we can explain almost all the variation in the purchase intensities of
one group of trade leaders by knowing the purchase intensities of another group. As for
traders on TradEx, we report contemporaneous correlations (where τ = 0) of 58.4%, 48.2%,
and 32.7% for M, W, and D frequencies, respectively. These results are significantly lower
compared to those of trade leaders, thus confirming our earlier results of higher herding
levels under the scopic regime relative to a traditional trading environment. Furthermore,
compared to the evidence presented in the literature on individual equity investors, the
monthly contemporaneous correlation among trade leaders on SocialEx is around 14% and
24% higher than the results reported by Merli and Roger (2013) and Barber et al. (2009),
respectively.
The remaining rows of Table 8 and Table 9 (i.e. where τ > 0) show the correlations
between the purchase intensities at time t and t + τ for SocialEx and TradEx, respectively.
In general, the correlations for trade leaders on SocialEx are significantly higher compared
to those of traders on TradEx across all time horizons, and for all frequencies. For example,
given a time horizon of τ = 1, we report correlations for SocialEx greater than 90% for
M and W frequencies and greater than 70% for a daily frequency. The results for TradEx
given the same τ are around 39%, 33%, and 22% for M, W, and D frequencies, respectively.
Moreover, the results reported in the literature for individual equity investors based on a
monthly frequency for the same time horizon of τ = 1 are similar to those of traders on
TradEx. For instance, Merli and Roger (2013) report correlations of 30.27% and 31.50%,
and Barber et al. (2009) report values between 46.7% and 48.2% for the large discount broker
and 55.8% and 58.6% for the large retail broker. Similar results are found for the rest of the
time horizons, indicating that persistence in herding behavior is significantly higher under a
scopic regime compared to a traditional trading environment.
Another important finding of this analysis is that persistence fades away at a slower rate
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under a scopic environment compared to a traditional trading environment. For example,
based on a monthly frequency and considering the two time horizons τ = 6 and τ = 11, the
correlations for trade leaders on SocialEx are around 80% and 70%, respectively — down
from around 92% for τ = 1. The correlations for the same time horizons on TradEx are
around 24% — down from around 39% for τ = 1. Similarly for individual equity investors,
Barber et al. (2009) report correlations of 17.9% and 10.3% for the same time horizons at
the large discount broker, and 31.8% and 23.2% at the large retail broker, while Merli and
Roger (2013) report correlations of 8.21% and 3.55% for the two time horizons, respectively.
The strong evidence of persistence in herding over the various time horizons under the
scopic regime indicates that this phenomenon is not due to momentary events of increased
uncertainty. Herding remains relatively high even across a horizon of almost one year. The
significant difference in the rate of decay of persistence in herding over time between trade
leaders in a scopic environment and traders in a traditional trading environment indicates
that social trading, through its social features and scopic regime, has an additional con-
formism effect on participants. Trade leaders do not imitate each other only in the current
period, but rather do so continuously across long time lags, which is made possible given the
publicly disclosed order flow data on the STP. This finding challenges traditional financial
theory since it shows that individuals under a scopic environment look at past information
and trading activity as far back as one year when making trading decisions. One explana-
tion for this phenomenon is that the excess herding produced by the scopic environment is
stimulated by the limitations and biases of individual traders to analyze a large number of
assets in a highly dynamic environment. Hence, these individuals may simply opt to imitate
the consensus of the majority even across long time lags. While this persistence can be con-
sidered as intentional perpetual herding, further research is necessary to investigate whether
order flow data may still contain genuine predictive power, despite it being publicly disclosed
on the platform. Such an analysis would allow us to determine whether the autoregressive
pattern in herding behavior is rational.
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6 Conclusion
Does a scopic, information-rich environment augment the limitations and personal biases
of individual traders, thus producing excess and perpetual herding levels that are higher
than those found in traditional trading environments? Using data from a popular STP,
which we call SocialEx, that is governed by a scopic regime and mandates high information
transparency regarding order flow, and another data set from an anonymous online foreign
exchange broker, we show that the scopic environment produces excess levels of herding
over and above those found in traditional trading environments. Moreover, we show that
herding among trade leaders on the STP is high when market information is scarce, and
that this heightened level of herding is absent among traders on TradEx. This indicates
that the scopic environment encourages individuals to seek information from the activities
of others when market information regarding an asset is limited, which may be interpreted
as evidence of intentional herding due to informational cascades. We find herding to be
relatively low among risk-seeking trade leaders, which supports the notion that risk-seekers
tend to be overconfident in their own abilities, thus herd less. In addition, high-risk strategies
tend to deter others from following suit. As such, the scopic regime encourages herding
mostly in the middle of the risk spectrum, where traders understand that there is a modest
trade-off between maintaining status quo as leaders and avoiding large losses. Our results
also show that traders who have more to lose are more likely to herd as they fathom the
disappointment associated with underperforming on large positions. Moreover, herding is
high for the smallest sized trades in the scopic environment, which may be due to trade
leaders using very small portions of their capital as an option to try and emulate potentially
profitable trades. Finally, we show that herding in the scopic environment persists across
several time horizons at much higher levels, and fades away much slower compared to herding
in traditional environments.
Our findings challenge traditional financial theory since we show that exposure to more
information leads to increased local levels of and persistence in herding behavior. This means
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that trade leaders base their trading decisions in large part on the current and historical
trading activities of others. We argue that the scopic environment augments the biases
and limited capacity of individual retail traders to analyze many assets and make quick
decisions in a highly dynamic environment, consequently prompting traders to imitate the
actions of others irrespective of how dated they are. Hence, the information-rich scopic
environment stimulates a conformist attitude towards trading, whereby individuals easily
mimic the trading activities of others. The motivation to adopt this attitude is further
boosted by the compensation schemes offered to traders who manage the capital of copiers.
As a consequence, traders choose to herd continuously in order to avoid underperforming
their peers and tarnishing their reputation. While our findings suggest that the excess and
perpetual herding generated by the scopic environment is intentional, further research on the
information content of publicly disclosed order flow data is necessary to investigate whether
this behavior is rational. The data limitations in this paper do not allow us to investigate
herding in relation to trader performance and demographics. Hence, future research can
provide refined insight into whether trade leaders are more likely to herd with those who
have performed well in the past, or those who belong to a specific demographic group.
For instance, researchers can investigate whether traders who herd in a scopic environment
exhibit the hot hand fallacy, whereby they expect past performance of experts to be positively
correlated with future performance in a market that is typically characterized by a random
walk (Huber et al., 2010). Such an analysis could show whether individuals tend to herd
with those who they deem to be informed, and whether mimicking their future trades would
generate superior risk-adjusted returns.
The high level of and persistence in herding behavior among trade leaders on STPs
unveils several implications. First, from a macroeconomic perspective, it has been argued
that intentional herding increases market volatility due to the high correlation among trades
(Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003; Barber et al., 2009). This issue may quickly materialize
as STPs become more popular among retail traders, while regulators remain largely absent
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from monitoring these platforms and setting pre-emptive protocols to protect na¨ıve investors.
Second, with respect to copiers who wish to diversify across multiple trade leaders, the ben-
efits of diversification are greatly diminished in the presence of herding. This is because
trade leaders who herd are essentially trading the same assets in the same direction and
at the same time. Hence, copiers should proceed with caution and take into account herd-
ing behavior when selecting the trade leaders they wish to allocate their funds to. Third,
STPs offer performance compensation programs to trade leaders based on the number of
copiers they attract or on their actual trading performance. While trade leaders who are
authentically skilled should be compensated for their efforts and added value, others who
simply herd should not be compensated similarly, since this may drive truly skilled traders
to exit the social trading network. Finally, while our study focuses on retail traders who
are predominantly active in the foreign exchange market, our findings can be extrapolated
to other financial markets as well as institutional traders, such as hedge funds, who are un-
der constant pressure to disclose their holdings and strategies so that investors have greater
transparency regarding their investments. Investors may enjoy having a clearer picture of
how their money is invested; however, this comes at the cost of increased herding among
hedge funds, curtailed authentic research and lower potential returns.
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Table 3: Herding and Trading Intensity on SocialEx. This table presents the es-
timated coefficients of the herding measures HLSV , HFHW , IHM , SIASfull, SIASown,
and SIASother for the SocialEx data set based on several minimum thresholds for the number
of transactions executed. Standard errors for each herding measure are shown in parentheses
underneath the estimates. Herding measures are reported for quarterly (Q), monthly (M),
weekly (W), and daily (D) periods. Moreover, the number of instrument-periods, (i, t) and
average number of trades per instrument, Trades are also reported.
Min. Trades t HLSV HFHW IHM SIASfull SIASown SIASother (i, t) Trades
n ≥ 0 Q 0.195 *** 0.264 *** 0.015 *** 0.865 *** 0.003 0.862 *** 311 12,977
(0.02) (0.009) (0.0002) (0.05) (0.002) (0.02)
M 0.189 *** 0.270 *** 0.0184 *** 0.918 *** 0.01 *** 0.907 *** 795 4,622
(0.01) (0.006) (0.0002) (0.05) (0.003) (0.02)
W 0.166 *** 0.260 *** 0.0237 *** 0.924 *** 0.025 *** 0.899 *** 2,426 1,280
(0.006) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.06) (0.004) (0.01)
D 0.118 *** 0.211 *** 0.0328 *** 0.775 *** 0.016 *** 0.759 *** 8,895 290
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.133) (0.001) (0.01)
n ≥ 100 Q 0.172 *** 0.230 *** 0.021 *** 0.850 *** 0.001 *** 0.849 *** 166 17,881
(0.02) (0.007) (0.0004) (0.08) (3.7e−5) (0.06)
M 0.142 *** 0.195 *** 0.0259 *** 0.782 *** 0.002 *** 0.780 *** 360 7,510
(0.012) (0.005) (0.0005) (0.108) (0.0001) (0.05)
W 0.126 *** 0.184 *** 0.034 *** 0.850 *** 0.004 *** 0.846 *** 1,339 1,956
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.105) (0.0001) (0.02)
D 0.107 *** 0.171 *** 0.0405 *** 0.822 *** 0.004 *** 0.818 *** 4,406 510
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.158) (0.0001) (0.01)
n ≥ 200 Q 0.147 *** 0.199 *** 0.0214 *** 0.788 *** 0.0004 *** 0.787 *** 132 21,100
(0.02) (0.008) (0.0004) (0.101) (4.6e−5) (0.137)
M 0.134 *** 0.184 *** 0.0264 *** 0.778 *** 0.001 *** 0.777 *** 332 7,964
(0.01) (0.004) (0.0005) (0.111) (0.0001) (0.04)
W 0.127 *** 0.181 *** 0.0348 *** 0.857 *** 0.003 *** 0.854 *** 1,198 2,162
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.109) (0.0001) (0.02)
D 0.09 *** 0.150 *** 0.041 *** 0.827 *** 0.003 *** 0.824 *** 2,910 709
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.183) (0.0001) (0.02)
n ≥ 300 Q 0.142 *** 0.193 *** 0.0206 *** 0.792 *** 0.0005 *** 0.791 *** 124 21,917
(0.02) (0.007) (0.0004) (0.104) (4.8e−5) (0.138)
M 0.131 *** 0.180 *** 0.0258 *** 0.778 *** 0.001 *** 0.778 *** 318 8,279
(0.01) (0.003) (0.0005) (0.114) (4.9e−5) (0.04)
W 0.129 *** 0.181 *** 0.0342 *** 0.863 *** 0.002 *** 0.860 *** 1,068 2,394
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.112) (0.0001) (0.02)
D 0.08 *** 0.139 *** 0.0406 *** 0.823 *** 0.0025 *** 0.820 *** 2,180 896
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.219) (4.6e−5) (0.02)
n ≥ 400 Q 0.134 *** 0.182 *** 0.0199 *** 0.796 *** 0.0005 *** 0.795 *** 115 23,185
(0.02) (0.008) (0.0004) (0.120) (0.0001) (0.139)
M 0.131 *** 0.180 *** 0.0251 *** 0.785 *** 0.001 *** 0.784 *** 313 8,375
(0.01) (0.004) (0.0005) (0.112) (0.0001) (0.05)
W 0.132 *** 0.183 *** 0.034 *** 0.869 *** 0.002 *** 0.866 *** 980 2,582
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.117) (0.0001) (0.02)
D 0.08 *** 0.135 *** 0.0405 *** 0.799 *** 0.0025 *** 0.797 *** 1,708 1,100
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.241) (0.0001) (0.03)
n ≥ 500 Q 0.130 *** 0.177 *** 0.0206 *** 0.795 *** 0.0005 *** 0.794 *** 111 23,743
(0.02) (0.006) (0.0004) (0.119) (4.1e−5) (0.139)
M 0.130 *** 0.179 *** 0.0255 *** 0.783 *** 0.001 *** 0.781 *** 309 8,462
(0.011) (0.004) (0.0005) (0.113) (0.0001) (0.05)
W 0.132 *** 0.182 *** 0.0344 *** 0.859 *** 0.002 *** 0.857 *** 871 2,856
(0.005) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.127) (0.0001) (0.02)
D 0.079 *** 0.127 *** 0.0409 *** 0.796 *** 0.002 *** 0.794 *** 1,411 1,241
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.275) (0.0001) (0.05)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4: Herding and Trading Intensity on TradEx. This table presents the esti-
mated coefficients of the herding measures HLSV , HFHW , IHM , SIASfull, SIASown,
and SIASother for the TradEx data set based on several minimum thresholds for the number
of transactions executed. Standard errors for each herding measure are shown in parentheses
underneath the estimates. Herding measures are reported for quarterly (Q), monthly (M),
weekly (W), and daily (D) periods. Moreover, the number of instrument-periods, (i, t) and
average number of trades per instrument, Trades are also reported.
Min. Trades t HLSV HFHW IHM SIASfull SIASown SIASother (i, t) Trades
n ≥ 0 Q 0.025 *** 0.05 *** 0.0017 *** 0.672 *** 0.002 ** 0.670 *** 188 35,606
(0.008) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.22) (0.001) (0.08)
M 0.033 *** 0.08 *** 0.0024 *** 0.494 ** 0.004 *** 0.489 *** 510 12,950
(0.005) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.216) (0.001) (0.06)
W 0.034 *** 0.087 *** 0.0044 *** 0.429 * 0.011 *** 0.418 *** 2,094 3,193
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.229) (0.001) (0.031)
D 0.035 *** 0.10 *** 0.0092 *** 0.361 0.026 *** 0.335 *** 10,395 607
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.274) (0.001) (0.014)
n ≥ 100 Q 0.022 *** 0.045 *** 0.0017 *** 0.661 *** 0.001 *** 0.660 *** 174 35,657
(0.008) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.239) (0.0001) (0.08)
M 0.029 *** 0.068 *** 0.0024 *** 0.504 ** 0.003 *** 0.501 *** 478 13,073
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.228) (0.0002) (0.06)
W 0.034 *** 0.077 *** 0.0043 *** 0.437 0.006 *** 0.431 *** 1,758 3,530
(0.002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.268) (0.0002) (0.03)
D 0.029 *** 0.073 *** 0.0085 *** 0.376 0.006 *** 0.370 *** 5,268 1,067
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.338) (0.0002) (0.023)
n ≥ 200 Q 0.023 *** 0.051 *** 0.0016 *** 0.677 *** 0.001 *** 0.676 *** 167 35,792
(0.006) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.244) (0.0001) (0.09)
M 0.03 *** 0.065 *** 0.0024 *** 0.539 ** 0.0024 *** 0.537 *** 445 13,922
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.232) (0.0002) (0.07)
W 0.032 *** 0.069 *** 0.0042 *** 0.423 0.005 *** 0.418 *** 1,515 4,033
(0.002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.289) (0.0002) (0.037)
D 0.023 *** 0.058 *** 0.0075 *** 0.397 0.0031 *** 0.394 *** 3,704 1,507
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.347) (0.0001) (0.029)
n ≥ 300 Q 0.024 *** 0.051 *** 0.0016 *** 0.665 *** 0.001 *** 0.664 *** 163 36,054
(0.006) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.253) (0.0001) (0.08)
M 0.03 *** 0.063 *** 0.0024 *** 0.499 ** 0.002 *** 0.496 *** 430 14,186
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.243) (0.0001) (0.07)
W 0.031 *** 0.065 *** 0.0042 *** 0.486 0.004 *** 0.482 *** 1,323 4,546
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.309) (0.0002) (0.038)
D 0.022 *** 0.054 *** 0.0066 *** 0.372 0.0025 *** 0.369 *** 2,963 1,867
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.340) (0.0001) (0.036)
n ≥ 400 Q 0.023 *** 0.051 *** 0.0016 *** 0.684 *** 0.001 *** 0.684 *** 158 36,421
(0.006) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.261) (0.0001) (0.08)
M 0.029 *** 0.061 *** 0.0024 *** 0.508 ** 0.0022 *** 0.506 *** 416 14,452
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.253) (0.0001) (0.07)
W 0.032 *** 0.064 *** 0.0042 *** 0.524 * 0.003 *** 0.521 *** 1,176 5,079
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.311) (0.0001) (0.046)
D 0.021 *** 0.049 *** 0.0064 *** 0.396 0.002 *** 0.394 *** 2,450 2,210
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.389) (0.0001) (0.04)
n ≥ 500 Q 0.024 *** 0.052 *** 0.0016 *** 0.758 *** 0.001 *** 0.757 *** 154 36,717
(0.006) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.232) (0.0001) (0.08)
M 0.029 *** 0.059 *** 0.0024 *** 0.539 ** 0.002 *** 0.537 *** 398 14,938
(0.003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.247) (0.0001) (0.06)
W 0.032 *** 0.063 *** 0.0041 *** 0.509 0.0026 *** 0.506 *** 1,045 5,657
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.317) (0.0001) (0.048)
D 0.02 *** 0.046 *** 0.0061 *** 0.468 0.002 *** 0.467 *** 2,022 2,671
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.425) (0.0001) (0.047)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5: Herding and Leverage on SocialEx. This table presents the estimated coeffi-
cients of the herding measures HLSV , HFHW , IHM , SIASfull, SIASown, and SIASother
for the SocialEx data set based on the different levels of leverage used. Standard errors for
each herding measure are shown in parentheses underneath the estimates. Herding measures
are reported for quarterly (Q), monthly (M), weekly (W), and daily (D) periods. More-
over, the number of instrument-periods, (i, t) and average number of trades per instrument,
Trades are also reported.
Leverage t HLSV HFHW IHM SIASfull SIASown SIASother (i, t) Trades
2 to 1 Q 0.075 *** 0.280 *** 0.0395 *** NA NA NA 37 13
(0.019) (0.035) (0.0117)
M 0.045 ** 0.234 *** 0.0262 * NA NA NA 59 7
(0.018) (0.027) (0.014)
W 0.0031 0.201 0.0369 ** NA NA NA 96 3
(0.0023) (0.132) (0.0146)
D 0.012 * 0.113 * 0.0363 *** NA NA NA 110 <1
(0.0067) (0.065) (0.0131)
5 to 1 Q 0.095 *** 0.238 *** 0.0259 *** 0.546 ** 0.106 0.440 *** 54 34
(0.022) (0.021) (0.0053) (0.216) (0.093) (0.066)
M 0.091 *** 0.283 *** 0.0443 *** 0.354 0.045 *** 0.309 *** 77 16
(0.012) (0.016) (0.0068) (0.377) (0.013) (0.062)
W 0.056 *** 0.158 *** 0.0611 *** NA NA NA 108 11
(0.012) (0.008) (0.0081)
D 0.0956 *** 0.128 *** 0.0664 *** NA NA NA 25 8
(0.0049) (0.006) (0.0099)
10 to 1 Q 0.125 *** 0.238 *** 0.0323 *** 0.644 *** 0.017 *** 0.627 *** 100 265
(0.014) (0.010) (0.0028) (0.147) (0.003) (0.059)
M 0.110 *** 0.256 *** 0.0373 *** 0.654 *** 0.044 *** 0.610 *** 286 92
(0.011) (0.012) (0.0029) (0.184) (0.007) (0.049)
W 0.094 *** 0.222 *** 0.0575 *** 0.600 ** 0.242 0.358 *** 680 35
(0.0068) (0.005) (0.0034) (0.250) (0.197) (0.047)
D 0.061 *** 0.173 *** 0.0784 *** 0.518 0.419 *** 0.099 1,116 14
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.395) (0.072) (0.102)
25 to 1 Q 0.143 *** 0.210 *** 0.0492 *** 0.793 *** 0.002 0.791 *** 105 1,742
(0.007) (0.004) (0.0017) (0.001) (0.071) (0.134)
M 0.133 *** 0.215 *** 0.0589 *** 0.493 *** 0.011 *** 0.482 *** 310 591
(0.007) (0.003) (0.0019) (0.172) (0.0016) (0.069)
W 0.105 *** 0.203 *** 0.0769 *** 0.583 *** 0.038 *** 0.545 *** 1,248 145
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0022) (0.176) (0.002) (0.027)
D 0.096 *** 0.215 *** 0.097 *** 0.562 ** 0.083 *** 0.479 *** 4,308 36
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0025) (0.236) (0.004) (0.016)
50 to 1 Q 0.124 *** 0.173 *** 0.0444 *** 0.709 *** 0.001 *** 0.708 *** 105 4,294
(0.011) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.130) (0.0002) (0.213)
M 0.121 *** 0.180 *** 0.0535 *** 0.602 *** 0.005 *** 0.597 *** 310 1,463
(0.007) (0.002) (0.0009) (0.147) (0.0007) (0.068)
W 0.108 *** 0.183 *** 0.0648 *** 0.574 *** 0.0179 *** 0.556 *** 1,300 347
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.163) (0.002) (0.033)
D 0.091 *** 0.192 *** 0.0814 *** 0.475 ** 0.039 *** 0.435 *** 5,931 68
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.206) (0.002) (0.016)
100 to 1 Q 0.101 *** 0.142 *** 0.0189 *** 0.725 *** 0.0006 *** 0.724 *** 105 9,360
(0.011) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.139) (3.4e−5) (0.144)
M 0.105 *** 0.151 *** 0.0241 *** 0.607 *** 0.002 ** 0.605 *** 310 3,161
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.141) (0.001) (0.08)
W 0.0952 *** 0.155 *** 0.0306 *** 0.563 *** 0.0077 *** 0.556 *** 1,326 736
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.164) (0.0004) (0.037)
D 0.078 *** 0.163 *** 0.0416 *** 0.375 * 0.021 *** 0.354 *** 7,091 129
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.194) (0.001) (0.017)
200 to 1 Q 0.082 *** 0.130 *** 0.0122 *** 0.823 *** 0.0005 *** 0.822 *** 65 3,680
(0.012) (0.004) (0.0004) (0.176) (3.9e−5) (0.240)
M 0.084 *** 0.142 *** 0.0148 *** 0.631 *** 0.002 *** 0.629 *** 194 1,233
(0.007) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.202) (0.0002) (0.08)
W 0.07 *** 0.143 *** 0.0179 *** 0.409 * 0.007 *** 0.402 *** 838 285
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.235) (0.0004) (0.038)
D 0.048 *** 0.139 *** 0.0245 *** 0.427 0.027 *** 0.399 *** 3,790 58
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.265) (0.001) (0.022)
400 to 1 Q 0.080 *** 0.125 *** 0.0065 *** 0.887 *** 0.0003 *** 0.887 *** 61 11,427
(0.011) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.171) (3.4e−5) (0.139)
M 0.087 *** 0.133 *** 0.0086 *** 0.682 *** 0.001 *** 0.681 *** 182 3,831
(0.006) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.181) (0.0003) (0.071)
W 0.071 *** 0.130 *** 0.0111 *** 0.520 ** 0.005 *** 0.515 *** 786 887
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.223) (0.0002) (0.044)
D 0.054 *** 0.137 *** 0.0157 *** 0.315 0.0197 *** 0.295 *** 4,180 157
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.259) (0.001) (0.023)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Herding and Trade Size on SocialEx. This table presents the estimated coeffi-
cients of the herding measures HLSV , HFHW , IHM , SIASfull, SIASown, and SIASother
for the SocialEx data set based on trade size that is allocated into quintiles. Quintile 1 con-
tains the largest trades while quintile 5 contains the smallest trades. Standard errors for each
herding measure are shown in parentheses underneath the estimates. Herding measures are
reported for quarterly (Q), monthly (M), weekly (W), and daily (D) periods. Moreover, the
number of instrument-periods, (i, t) and average number of trades per instrument, Trades
are also reported.
Quintile t HLSV HFHW IHM SIASfull SIASown SIASother (i, t) Trades
1 (Largest) Q 0.188 *** 0.318 *** 0.0139 *** 0.915 *** 0.013 *** 0.902 *** 246 2,613
(0.024) (0.024) (0.0007) (0.074) (0.003) (0.047)
M 0.168 *** 0.303 *** 0.0184 *** 0.809 *** 0.055 *** 0.755 *** 569 991
(0.013) (0.013) (0.0009) (0.101) (0.011) (0.042)
W 0.118 *** 0.215 *** 0.0256 *** 0.504 *** 0.06 *** 0.443 *** 1,453 339
(0.005) (0.003) (0.0015) (0.165) (0.009) (0.03)
D 0.083 *** 0.188 *** 0.0293 *** 0.457 * 0.054 *** 0.403 *** 6,375 76
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0018) (0.25) (0.003) (0.018)
2 Q 0.166 *** 0.260 *** 0.0118 *** 0.895 *** 0.004 ** 0.891 *** 284 2,171
(0.017) (0.017) (0.0005) (0.057) (0.002) (0.042)
M 0.161 *** 0.272 *** 0.0164 *** 0.841 *** 0.019 ** 0.821 *** 653 811
(0.010) (0.009) (0.0007) (0.087) (0.008) (0.034)
W 0.132 *** 0.230 *** 0.0224 *** 0.579 *** 0.024 *** 0.555 *** 1,514 294
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.159) (0.004) (0.032)
D 0.089 *** 0.193 *** 0.0279 *** 0.476 * 0.021 *** 0.456 *** 6,322 77
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.243) (0.002) (0.017)
3 Q 0.154 *** 0.255 *** 0.0244 *** 0.838 *** 0.006 0.832 *** 255 2,821
(0.021) (0.018) (0.0086) (0.074) (0.004) (0.092)
M 0.139 *** 0.242 *** 0.0289 *** 0.820 *** 0.016 * 0.804 *** 585 1,041
(0.009) (0.009) (0.0007) (0.105) (0.009) (0.046)
W 0.120 *** 0.211 *** 0.0366 *** 0.559 *** 0.02 *** 0.539 *** 1,272 324
(0.005) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.173) (0.006) (0.038)
D 0.088 *** 0.189 *** 0.0424 *** 0.453 * 0.015 *** 0.438 *** 5,891 81
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.251) (0.001) (0.017)
4 Q 0.123 *** 0.180 *** 0.0177 *** 0.807 *** 0.002 0.805 *** 267 3,377
(0.011) (0.007) (0.0007) (0.081) (0.002) (0.110)
M 0.117 *** 0.185 *** 0.0246 *** 0.880 *** 0.007 ** 0.873 *** 666 1,231
(0.007) (0.005) (0.0009) (0.082) (0.003) (0.027)
W 0.130 *** 0.213 *** 0.034 *** 0.756 *** 0.018 *** 0.739 *** 1,472 408
(0.006) (0.003) (0.0013) (0.134) (0.004) (0.033)
D 0.086 *** 0.188 *** 0.0416 *** 0.46 * 0.013 *** 0.447 *** 5,548 82
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0016) (0.266) (0.001) (0.019)
5 (Smallest) Q 0.169 *** 0.269 *** 0.0318 *** 0.816 *** 0.006 ** 0.810 *** 266 5,906
(0.030) (0.019) (0.0006) (0.068) (0.003) (0.110)
M 0.150 *** 0.254 *** 0.039 *** 0.913 *** 0.009 *** 0.904 *** 649 2,095
(0.013) (0.010) (0.0008) (0.065) (0.003) (0.022)
W 0.122 *** 0.222 *** 0.0497 *** 0.857 *** 0.016 *** 0.841 *** 1,271 656
(0.007) (0.005) (0.001) (0.115) (0.004) (0.016)
D 0.063 *** 0.159 *** 0.0585 *** 0.392 0.017 *** 0.376 *** 5,090 94
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.294) (0.001) (0.024)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: Herding and Trade Size on TradEx. This table presents the estimated coeffi-
cients of the herding measures HLSV , HFHW , IHM , SIASfull, SIASown, and SIASother
for the TradEx data set based on trade size that is allocated into quintiles. Quintile 1 con-
tains the largest trades while quintile 5 contains the smallest trades. Standard errors for each
herding measure are shown in parentheses underneath the estimates. Herding measures are
reported for quarterly (Q), monthly (M), weekly (W), and daily (D) periods. Moreover, the
number of instrument-periods, (i, t) and average number of trades per instrument, Trades
are also reported.
Quintile t HLSV HFHW IHM SIASfull SIASown SIASother (i, t) Trades
1 (Largest) Q 0.024 *** 0.068 *** 0.0039 *** 0.371 0.003 *** 0.369 *** 177 6,480
(0.005) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.292) (0.0003) (0.137)
M 0.025 *** 0.075 *** 0.0059 *** 0.196 0.011 *** 0.184 *** 482 2,367
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.274) (0.002) (0.058)
W 0.03 *** 0.101 *** 0.0091 *** 0.309 0.051 *** 0.259 *** 1,769 649
(0.0025) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.261) (0.007) (0.042)
D 0.025 *** 0.105 *** 0.0131 *** 0.407 0.081 *** 0.326 *** 6,469 167
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.365) (0.004) (0.024)
2 Q 0.015 * 0.036 *** 0.004 *** 0.145 0.002 *** 0.143 178 7,264
(0.008) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.266) (0.0004) (0.207)
M 0.019 *** 0.062 *** 0.0062 *** 0.197 0.006 *** 0.191 ** 486 2,717
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.273) (0.0007) (0.089)
W 0.02 *** 0.073 *** 0.0095 *** 0.307 0.019 *** 0.287 *** 1,852 706
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.258) (0.001) (0.04)
D 0.02 *** 0.088 *** 0.0139 *** 0.398 0.054 *** 0.344 *** 7,204 163
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.361) (0.003) (0.024)
3 Q 0.0276 *** 0.072 *** 0.0041 *** 0.182 0.001 0.180 108 10,591
(0.003) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.424) (0.001) (0.232)
M 0.024 *** 0.064 *** 0.0059 *** 0.08 0.004 *** 0.076 268 3,979
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.291) (0.0004) (0.229)
W 0.023 *** 0.073 *** 0.01 *** 0.254 0.012 *** 0.242 *** 1,144 949
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.264) (0.001) (0.052)
D 0.017 *** 0.077 *** 0.014 *** 0.386 0.032 *** 0.353 *** 5.011 193
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.366) (0.002) (0.04)
4 Q 0.014 *** 0.058 *** 0.0041 *** 0.247 0.003 0.243 167 6,721
(0.005) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.236) (0.002) (0.190)
M 0.018 *** 0.061 *** 0.0060 *** 0.322 0.007 ** 0.314 ** 455 2,837
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.217) (0.003) (0.125)
W 0.018 *** 0.064 *** 0.010 *** 0.264 0.018 *** 0.246 *** 1,753 707
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.252) (0.001) (0.039)
D 0.017 *** 0.076 *** 0.0134 *** 0.319 0.047 *** 0.272 *** 7,291 167
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.310) (0.002) (0.018)
5 (Smallest) Q 0.014 0.061 *** 0.0042 *** 0.689 ** 0.001 ** 0.688 *** 122 10,499
(0.013) (0.006) (0.0003) (0.322) (0.0004) (0.156)
M 0.006 0.01 *** 0.0063 *** 0.301 0.003 *** 0.298 ** 308 3,742
(0.007) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.289) (0.0002) (0.148)
W 0.001 0.006 *** 0.0102 *** 0.329 0.009 *** 0.320 *** 1,203 1,008
(0.005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.238) (0.0004) (0.055)
D 0.007 *** 0.024 *** 0.0134 *** 0.372 0.022 *** 0.350 *** 5,673 250
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.399) (0.001) (0.033)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8: Mean Contemporaneous and Time-Series Correlations of Purchase In-
tensities of Traders on SocialEx. The first row of the table (τ = 0) presents the monthly,
weekly, and daily mean contemporaneous correlations in percent of the purchase intensities
of two random groups of traders, G1 and G2. The other rows show the monthly, weekly,
and daily mean temporal correlations in percent of purchase intensities in period t with the
purchase intensities in period t + τ . The t-statistics are calculated based on the mean and
standard deviation of the correlations. For τ = 11 the t-statisitcs for the monthly correla-
tions of each group with itself cannot be computed due to the lack of degrees of freedom.
Correlation of
pii,t between
months t and
t+ τ
t-statistics
Correlation of
pii,t between
weeks t and t+ τ
t-statistics
Correlation of
pii,t between
days t and t+ τ
t-statistics
τ
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
0 100 100 98.5 NA NA 282 100 100 95.9 NA NA 198 100 100 77.4 NA NA 72.6
1 93 91.3 91.9 58.8 44 76.7 91.9 92.0 91.3 167 151 179 71.8 75.5 71.1 58.7 73.2 81.8
2 90.7 89.8 89.9 39.8 37.5 54.7 88.9 88.2 88.0 98.2 86.5 124 63.6 66.1 64.5 45.5 48.1 67.4
3 84.8 83.6 84.1 36.4 32.9 48.1 87.3 86.7 86.2 71.7 73.0 93.0 62.0 64.9 62.4 40.6 47.4 63.7
4 80.7 81.4 80.9 25.8 28.9 37.7 85.7 85.6 85.1 69.3 70.2 85.9 61.6 63.9 61.4 42.0 43.5 60.0
5 79.1 78.2 78.7 26.2 26.3 36.7 84.6 85.0 84.0 74.2 70.4 79.5 58.5 62.6 60.3 37.3 41.4 56.0
6 79.1 81.1 80 20.7 25.5 33.8 84.1 83.9 83.5 62.5 63.5 82.6 65.3 67.4 64.4 47.4 50.7 64.7
7 77.3 77.5 77.1 17.1 24 29.6 82.9 83.2 82.9 56.8 57.6 77.4 63.2 65.9 62.4 44.1 49.8 62.6
8 77.5 79.8 78.3 23.5 26.4 33.5 82.7 82.6 82.2 51.2 52.8 72.9 64.2 66.4 63.4 46.8 49.8 66.0
9 75.3 76.8 75.9 36.3 29.3 34.6 82.7 82.4 82.1 56.3 51.8 72.1 55.7 58.1 56.3 35.8 37.5 51.0
10 71.3 75.9 73 75.8 15.1 29 81.9 82.0 81.7 54.9 54.3 78.3 56.0 57.6 55.8 36.7 39.3 52.4
11 68.9 71.6 69.9 NA NA 37.8 80.9 80.7 80.4 58.5 56.1 76.6 56.0 57.0 55.7 36.0 34.6 49.8
12 79.6 79.5 79.3 53.8 49.7 70.6 55.2 56.7 55.6 35.6 34.2 47.8
13 77.4 78.0 77.9 48.9 48.6 69.4 61.0 62.4 61.1 44.1 42.7 58.8
14 77.2 77.5 76.9 46.3 47.7 65.7 60.2 62.0 59.6 43.9 44.7 56.7
15 74.9 75.9 75.1 44.7 43.5 61.0 60.3 63.0 60.4 41.7 44.3 58.6
16 74.6 75.7 75.0 44.8 45.7 62.5 53.8 56.0 53.8 34.2 34.0 47.9
17 75.0 74.6 74.6 46.2 44.8 62.1 53.8 55.5 53.2 32.7 34.2 44.2
18 74.2 74.7 74.4 49.0 44.3 68.8 51.8 53.5 52.6 30.2 31.6 44.1
19 73.1 73.8 73.1 42.3 40.8 57.3 53.9 54.0 53.0 33.8 29.5 45.1
20 72.9 73.3 72.6 36.7 37.6 52.2 58.7 59.7 59.2 38.1 38.6 56.3
21 71.3 72.6 72.1 32.6 33.4 47.9 58.2 59.4 58.5 38.0 39.6 54.0
22 71.9 73.1 72.6 38.9 34.2 51.7 58.1 60.5 58.9 38.7 39.5 54.0
23 72.0 73.1 72.7 36.6 44.3 59.9 51.4 54.8 52.4 28.8 32.4 45.0
24 71.9 73.7 72.9 40.9 38.1 59.1 50.7 52.3 51.1 28.8 28.7 41.8
25 71.6 74.2 72.9 36.7 44.5 55.3 51.3 53.2 51.7 29.8 32.0 42.5
26 71.7 75.0 73.4 42.4 41.0 61.4 50.1 53.1 51.1 28.3 29.3 40.6
27 71.8 75.2 73.7 46.0 42.2 57.2 59.1 59.6 58.9 39.8 36.3 54.4
28 71.7 75.2 73.6 35.3 44.6 56.0 56.0 58.5 57.5 34.9 36.5 52.5
29 69.3 73.3 71.2 38.3 40.6 56.8 55.7 60.2 58.5 34.0 38.6 53.1
30 68.3 73.0 70.5 35.6 35.8 52.8 50.2 52.7 51.0 29.6 30.5 42.6
31 69.4 73.7 71.4 33.4 34.8 50.2 50.3 50.5 49.6 29.4 29.3 39.4
32 67.5 73.3 70.5 28.8 31.5 44.0 51.2 50.4 50.3 32.0 29.6 40.6
33 69.0 72.8 71.1 26.5 28.4 40.0 50.8 51.3 50.2 30.4 28.1 39.0
34 71.9 73.3 72.7 32.4 25.3 43.1 57.1 58.6 57.3 35.3 36.7 49.9
35 70.5 74.8 73.2 34.9 34.4 53.6 56.0 56.7 56.7 35.2 35.1 51.2
36 73.0 76.6 74.7 46.9 46.4 67.3 55.2 57.9 56.7 31.5 35.4 48.7
37 72.4 75.1 73.8 49.8 45.5 71.9 49.9 52.6 50.0 28.3 30.6 39.5
38 70.2 74.6 72.7 52.1 45.9 75.8 49.5 50.4 49.5 26.9 27.6 37.5
39 67.6 72.2 70.0 40.3 37.4 53.8 48.4 50.9 50.3 25.6 28.8 41.4
40 68.2 71.9 69.9 40.2 42.8 60.0 49.3 51.1 49.6 26.7 29.4 39.2
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Table 9: Mean Contemporaneous and Time-Series Correlations of Purchase In-
tensities of Traders on TradEx. The first row of the table (τ = 0) presents the monthly,
weekly, and daily mean contemporaneous correlations in percent of the purchase intensities
of two random groups of traders, G1 and G2. The other rows show the monthly, weekly,
and daily mean temporal correlations in percent of purchase intensities in period t with the
purchase intensities in period t + τ . The t-statistics are calculated based on the mean and
standard deviation of the correlations.
Correlation of
pii,t between
months t and
t+ τ
t-statistics
Correlation of
pii,t between
weeks t and t+ τ
t-statistics
Correlation of
pii,t between
days t and t+ τ
t-statistics
τ
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
G1
with
G1
G2
with
G2
G1
with
G2
0 100 100 58.4 NA NA 10.3 100 100 48.2 NA NA 17.0 100.0 100.0 32.7 NA NA 23.4
1 42.9 35.0 38.7 7.4 6.0 9.0 29.3 38.8 31.4 10.3 14.8 15.6 25.1 23.1 19.0 17.4 15.5 18.4
2 34.2 27.2 32.5 6.4 4.4 8.7 23.4 30.0 26.9 8.3 10.0 13.7 17.8 15.7 13.3 11.7 10.2 12.0
3 37.2 37.9 32.0 7.4 8.0 7.6 19.6 23.9 21.4 7.1 8.5 10.8 20.5 16.3 13.6 13.1 10.5 12.5
4 30.0 34.8 32.5 4.9 6.1 8.2 18.5 24.3 23.5 6.5 8.2 11.8 15.7 10.3 11.0 10.1 6.4 10.0
5 29.0 33.5 29.9 5.5 5.9 7.4 16.8 27.2 24.4 5.8 9.1 12.0 16.3 11.0 12.0 10.7 6.8 11.0
6 22.5 26.2 23.2 3.9 5.6 5.1 21.1 26.4 21.2 7.3 9.1 10.6 16.1 13.9 13.5 10.7 9.4 13.1
7 22.8 28.5 23.9 4.3 6.0 6.4 18.1 22.9 20.8 6.5 7.9 10.2 16.7 11.5 12.4 12.9 8.3 13.1
8 23.0 29.2 23.5 4.1 5.8 5.8 20.5 19.2 17.0 7.1 6.4 8.0 13.9 12.9 11.8 9.5 8.8 11.6
9 22.2 27.3 27.6 3.6 4.0 6.0 21.6 22.8 21.6 8.1 7.7 11.7 13.1 10.3 10.2 8.7 6.5 9.3
10 25.9 18.3 20.9 4.6 3.5 4.9 19.3 20.3 21.1 7.4 6.6 10.0 12.2 8.6 9.8 7.8 5.7 8.8
11 24.0 25.7 22.1 4.3 4.4 5.4 16.0 23.6 20.1 6.2 8.7 10.3 13.2 10.8 10.7 8.7 7.0 9.8
12 16.3 22.9 19.6 5.9 9.1 9.4 13.4 10.5 10.8 8.8 6.8 9.9
13 18.3 22.9 20.3 6.5 7.5 9.7 14.0 11.3 12.4 10.1 7.6 12.1
14 21.5 27.4 21.2 7.2 10.0 10.5 12.8 9.6 10.9 10.0 6.8 11.2
15 19.6 24.6 21.7 7.0 8.3 10.4 13.8 12.2 10.1 9.2 8.4 9.6
16 22.4 25.7 21.3 7.9 8.9 10.5 12.1 11.2 9.1 7.8 7.5 8.2
17 21.5 23.8 22.0 8.0 8.4 10.6 11.6 6.9 10.1 7.6 4.3 9.2
18 15.1 21.3 18.2 5.3 7.6 8.8 8.3 9.4 8.6 5.1 6.0 7.6
19 21.1 20.8 21.4 7.7 7.0 10.8 10.7 7.3 7.5 7.0 4.6 7.0
20 16.2 21.5 19.2 5.0 7.4 9.5 11.5 6.5 9.3 7.8 4.3 9.2
21 16.0 21.5 18.9 5.2 7.7 8.8 9.9 7.9 8.8 7.4 6.0 9.3
22 16.8 17.7 17.3 6.1 5.8 8.7 9.7 9.7 8.1 6.4 6.6 7.8
23 22.5 17.0 16.2 8.4 5.7 7.9 7.7 9.3 7.8 5.0 6.0 7.2
24 15.7 19.2 16.6 5.4 6.5 8.2 8.4 8.8 8.9 5.4 5.7 8.3
25 20.1 16.7 14.1 7.2 5.6 7.0 9.0 11.4 11.4 5.9 7.2 10.5
26 13.5 16.5 14.4 4.6 5.8 7.4 8.7 7.8 6.9 5.6 5.1 6.2
27 9.8 11.8 14.0 3.4 4.0 7.1 10.4 7.1 9.5 6.9 4.9 9.2
28 15.5 14.6 14.6 5.0 4.9 7.0 10.8 8.1 10.1 8.0 6.1 10.7
29 14.2 16.2 15.2 5.0 5.5 7.5 8.8 7.4 7.8 5.9 4.9 7.4
30 11.2 16.7 14.8 3.8 5.6 7.1 9.8 9.2 8.8 6.3 5.9 8.2
31 14.9 19.7 15.1 4.8 6.7 7.2 9.6 9.0 10.6 6.1 5.7 9.7
32 13.5 15.4 13.2 4.6 4.8 6.0 8.8 7.7 9.1 5.8 5.0 8.2
33 12.9 20.2 16.9 4.0 7.4 8.2 9.9 8.4 8.8 6.4 5.2 7.8
34 14.7 19.1 13.5 4.7 5.9 5.9 12.0 11.3 10.0 8.6 7.4 9.4
35 14.9 18.6 17.5 4.7 7.1 8.9 12.2 8.9 9.9 9.0 6.6 10.2
36 17.0 20.0 18.0 6.3 6.7 8.4 8.5 11.6 11.2 5.7 7.8 10.9
37 14.5 17.6 13.3 4.6 5.4 6.0 9.7 11.2 9.5 6.4 6.9 8.7
38 17.0 22.1 18.8 5.8 7.6 8.2 9.3 9.4 9.0 6.0 6.1 8.1
39 13.6 20.6 15.3 3.9 6.6 7.1 7.0 7.9 9.5 4.5 5.1 8.7
40 15.1 14.1 17.8 5.0 4.6 8.4 8.1 8.0 8.2 5.0 5.2 7.6
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